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This paper focus on the trade-o⁄between work and informal care among individuals aged 50 to
65. We ￿rst outlines the standard microeconomic model used to study how individuals allocate their
time between labour, parental care and leisure. From the two ￿rst-order conditions of the standard
model, we jointly estimate the time devoted to work and care through a bi-tobit model allowing
to take into account both the simultaneity of the decisions and the censure which characterizes
each variable. The model is estimated using data from SHARE, a European multidisciplinary
database of micro data on health, socio-economic status and family network. Estimation results do
not appear consistent with the standard microeconomic framework and lead us to reformulate the
microeconomic model in order to take into account a potential positive e⁄ect of the worker status
on the propensity to provide care The reformulation proposed is empirically validated by the the
estimation of a double selection model. Our main ￿nding con￿rms results of qualitative survey and
suggests that the e⁄ect of paid work on time devoted to care may be decompose into (i) a discret
positif e⁄ect, the labour market participation a⁄ecting positively the propensity to provide care,
and (ii) a continuous negative e⁄ect, each worked hour reducing time devoted to parental care.
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11 Introduction
Population ageing is considered in Europe as a major challenge in the coming decades, especially
because of the sustainability question of public pensions systems. To contain the dependency ratio,
the Stockholm European Council (2001) has set a target for Member States to raise the employment
rate to a European average of 67%, setting speci￿c objectives for the senior population. According
to the Stockholm European Council conclusions, ￿it has agreed to set an EU target for increasing
the average EU employment rate among older women and men (55-64) to 50 % by 2010￿ 1. This
target of 50% was subsequently renewed by the Community Lisbon Program (2005).
In parallel, the growing proportion of elderly in the population is likely to increase the demand
for long-term care. To allow the frail elderly to live in the community without excessively increasing
public long-term care expenditures, most of the EU members encourage, more or less explicitly,
family members to provide care for elderly people.
Considering that senior play a major role in caring for dependent elderly people, it is appropriate
to ask whether a policy aimed at extending the work lives of seniors is compatible with a policy
aimed at supporting informal care for elderly people. Won￿ t informal care decrease if the senior
employment rate rises? Or, looking at it from the opposite side, won￿ t shifting the burden of care
for elderly people to families hamper growth in senior employment?
Using data from the second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE, 2006-2007)2, ￿gure 1 illustrates at the national level the relationship between the em-
ployment rate for women aged 50 to 65 with one living parent3, with the proportion of ￿intensive￿
caregivers, de￿ned as those who devote to parental care more than one hour a day or who co-reside
with their parent. A decreasing relationship appears between the labour force participation and
the provision of informal care. At one end, there are Northern European countries and Switzerland,
which present a high employment rate and a low proportion of intensive caregivers. At the other
end are the countries of Southeast and Eastern European characterized by a low employment rate
1In 2001, the European employment rate of this population was 37.7% (Eurostat).
2See section 3 for a description of the data.
3We focus in this chapter on caregiving provided by children to their parent living without a spouse. Children
caregiving behaviour greatly depends on the presence or absence of a spouse caregiver (see chapter 1).
2and a high proportion of intensive caregivers. Continental European countries lie somewhere in
between.
Figure 2 highlights a similar negative correlation at the individual level : the women labour
force participation decreases according to the intensity of care provided for a non-coresiding elderly
parent. It appears however that women who provide less than an hour a day of care are more
frequently employed than no caregivers. This result suggests that the relationship between work
and care is not only based on a pure substitution e⁄ect between the two activities.
The aim of this paper is to highlight the individual interaction process between working and
caregiving behaviour among the senior population. We ￿rst present the standard individual time
allocation model between paid work, leisure and parental care. The model produces testable im-
plications. In particular, working time and caregiving time appears as two competing activities :
every exogenous shocks a⁄ecting positively one activity leads to a reducation of time devoted to
the other activity. In order to test the implications of this model, we estimate a bi-tobit model
allowing to take into account the simultaneously of the care and work decision and the censure
which characterized each variable. Estimation results do not appear consistent with the standard
microeconomic framework and lead us to reformulate it in order to take into account a potential
positive e⁄ect of worker status on the propensity to provide parental care. The estimation of a
double selection model provides results consistent with the reformulated microeconomic model.
Indeed, our main ￿nding suggests that the e⁄ect of paid work on time devoted to care may be
decompose into a discret positif e⁄ect, the labour market participation a⁄ecting positively the pro-
pensity to provide care, and a continuous negative e⁄ect, each worked hour reducing time devoted
to parental care.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature. Section
3 outlines the data used in the analysis. Section 4 presents a simple microeconomic model of
the trade-o⁄ between labour and care. Section 5 empirically tests the implication of the model.
Section 6 outlines a reformulation of the standard microeconomic framework. Section 7 provides
an empirical validation of this new microeconomic framework. Finally, section 8 concludes.
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Population : Women aged 50 to 65 and having only one living parent.
Source : Eurostat and SHARE, wave 2 (2006-2007)
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Population : Women aged 50 to 65 and having only one living parent (women co-residing with
their elderly parent are excluded because of lack of information on their caregiving behaviour)
Source : SHARE, wave 2 (2006-2007)
42 Previous literature
Since the mid-80s, several empirical studies have analysed the relationship between labour and
caregiving behaviour.
The literature is very heterogeneous with regards to the studied population and the measure of
the outcomes related to labour supply and care provision. Most studies investigate the interaction
between care provision and labour supply on particular samples, restricted the analysis to informal
caregivers (Muurinen, 1986; Stone et al., 1987; Stone and Short,1990; Boaz and Muller, 1992),
married daughters (Wolf and Soldo, 1994), daughters (Ettner, 1995; Pezzin and Schone, 1995;
Kolodinsky and Shirey, 2000; Crespo, 2006), women (Mac Lanahan and Manson, 1990; Pavalko
and Artis, 1997; Carmichael and Charles, 1998; Spiess and Schneider, 2002; Berecki-Gisolf et al.,
2008; Casado-Marin et al., 2007), child (B￿rsch-Supan et al., 1992; Stern, 1995; Ettner 1996;
Johnson and Lo Sasso, 2000, Bolin et al., 2007), while others only restricted the sample according
to an age criteria, in order to select a population of working-age (Carmichael and Charles, 2003a;
Carmichael and Charles, 2003b; Heitmueller, 2007; Huetmueller and Inglis, 2007, Carmichael and
Charles, 2010). Note also that the care receiver di⁄ers among the studies. Some studies only
consider the care provide to parents, whereas others restricted to single parent or extend the
potential care receiver to step-parents, parents in law, spouses, children or non-members of the
family.
With regard to the outcome measure, several studies consider binary outcomes (provide care
or not, participate to the labour market or not) while others used ordinal outcomes (do not
provide care/provide non-intensive care/provide intensive care, do not participate to the labour
market/work part-time/work full time), non-ordinal outcomes (do not provide care/provide care
outside the household/provide care to a co-resident) or censored outcomes (the time devoted to
care or time spent working).
However, with regards to our study, the two main cleavages in the literature concern the cau-
sality direction empirically investigated and the way to deal with the endogeneity issues. Existing
literature generally focuses on one pathway of causation4.
4Pezzin and Schone (1999) and Borsch-Supan et al. (1992) estimate structural models allowing to identify how
the two endogenous outcomes related to work and care react to changes in exogenous variables. These models do
5* Causality direction : from care provision to labour supply
A large majority of studies focuses on the e⁄ect of the care provision on the labour supply.
From this point of view the care provision is seen as a determinant of the labour supply.
Muurinen (1986), using a US sample of primary caregivers of terminally-ill patients in a hospice
setting, ￿nd that the care provision leads to either withdrawal from the labour market or reduced
hours of work.
Stone et al. (1987) and Stone and Short (1990) use the US Informal Caregivers Survey (ICS), a
supplement to the 1982 National Long Term Care Survey (NLTC) and ￿nd that the care activity
leads to work accommodations, such as rearrangements of work schedule, reductions in work hours,
or taking unpaid leave. These three studies however used sample containing only caregivers. This
restriction does not allow to generalize the results to the overall population. Results obtained with
more representative samples leads however to similar conclusions.
Using data from the 1987-1988 National Survey of Families and Household (NFSFH), Mac
Lanahan and Manson (1990) ￿nd that the care provision signi￿cantly reduces the probability to
work and the conditional hours worked per week.
Kolodinsky and Shirey (2000), using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), study the
e⁄ect of co-residence with an elder parent on the labour supply. They ￿nd that the presence and
the characteristics of the parents negatively impact the labour market participation and the time
spent working.
In Europe, the ￿rst empirical studies have been conducted in UK. Using a sample of women
aged 21 to 59 from the 1985 General Household Survey (GHS), Carmichael and Charles (1998)
show that the impact of the care provision on the labour supply depends on the intensity of care.
They ￿nd that providing less than 20 hours per week of care increase the probability of employment
whereas providing more than 20 hours per week of care decreases the labour market participation.
Using the 1990 General Household Survey, the same authors ￿nd that the negative e⁄ect
of caregiving beyond a certain threshold would be lower for men than for women and that the
not allow to directly identify the causality between the two variables. However, the estimation of the structural
parameters suggests in both cases that the trade-o⁄s between labor supply and parental caregiving decisions is
relatively modest.
6negative e⁄ect on employment is greater for those caring for someone living in the same household
(Carmichael and Charles, 2003a; Carmichael and Charles, 2003b).
The main limitation of these empirical studies is the exogeneity assumption of the caregiving
behaviour. This assumption is very questionable. Indeed, the labour behaviour may act as a de-
terminant of the care provision. For instance, not working can favour the informal care provision
since non-workers generally face lower opportunity costs than workers. This reversal causality may
then bias the estimation of the e⁄ect of the care provision on the labour supply.
To take into account the potential simultaneity of decisions regarding employment and care,
most studies use an instrumental variable approach. The model generally includes two equations :
a reduced instrumental equation of the care provision and a structural equation of the labour
supply including the instrumented care provision as regressor. The model is then estimated either
in two-step or simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
Using data from the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), Wolf and Soldo
(1994) estimated a two step model. In the ￿rst step, they simultaneously estimated a reduced
form of the probability to provide parental care and to be employed. In the second step, they
estimate the e⁄ect of being caregiver on the hours of work, conditionally on the labour market
participation. They use a double-selection framework by adding as regressors two correction terms
computed from the ￿rst step. The ￿rst have to be seen as a standard selection term allowing to
correct the selection of the workers whereas the second one have to be seen as an augmented
regressor allowing to control for the correlation between the care provision and the residual of the
work hours equation. They ￿nd that the provision of parental care among married daughters does
not signi￿cantly reduce their propensities to be employed or their conditional hours of work.
Ettner (1995, 1996) adopt a similar empirical strategy but uses a two part model instead of a
selection model. From the 1986-1988 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), results suggest that coresidence with a disabled parent signi￿cantly reduces hours worked
among females aged 35 to 64, due primarily to withdrawal from the labour market. However,
she ￿nds no signi￿cant reduction of work hours due to nonhousehold member caregiving (Ettner,
1995). Ettner (1996), using the same data than Wolf and Soldo (1994) shows that the magnitude
of the caregiving impact on the labour supply is larger for women than for men and for coresidence
7than for non-coresidential care. However, the e⁄ect was signi￿cant only for women providing care
to parents residing outside the household.
Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) simultaneously estimate a structural equation of the annual hours
of paid work (taking into account the censoring of the variable) and a reduced equation of the care
provision, using US panel data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Restricting the
sample to men and women aged 53 to 65 and having at least one living parent, they identify a
signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of providing care to parents on the labour supply for both women and
men.
Crespo (2006) estimates a bivariate probit model on a sample of women aged 50 to 60 with
at least one living parent from the ￿rst wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE). Results suggest that providing ￿intensive￿informal care to parents negatively
impacts the labour market participation.
Heitmueller (2007), from the British Household Panel Study, adopts a standard IV approach
and ￿nd that providing care to a coresident reduces the propensity to work whereas no signi￿cant
e⁄ect is found for extra-household care provision.
Bolin et al. (2007) adopts the same empirical strategy, using data from the ￿rst wave of SHARE.
Results suggest than the care provision negatively impact the participation to the labour market
and the hours of work among workers.
Casado-Marin et al. (2008) exploit data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-
2001). They use treatment evaluation techniques (matching method and di⁄erences in di⁄erences)
to estimate the e⁄ects of caregiving on the labour market participation for women aged between
30 to 60. Results suggest that among women who were working before becoming a caregiver, there
is no signi￿cant reduction in the probability of being employed. However, for those who were not
working prior to becoming a caregiver, there is a signi￿cant decrease in the chances of entering
employment.
To summarize, a large majority of studies provide evidence of a sign￿cant negative e⁄ect of
caregiving on the labour supply, while others generally identify a negative but no signi￿cant ef-
fect. Taking into account the endogeneity of the care provision does not change this main result.
8However, all the previous mentioned studies using an IV approach show that not accommodating
for endogeneity of the care provision in the labour outcome equation overestimate the real impact
of an exogenous variation of caregiving (see Wolf and Soldo, 1994; Ettner, 1995; Ettner, 1996;
Jonhson et Lo Sasso, 2000; Crespo, 2006; Heitmueller, 2007; Bolin et al., 2007). Speci￿cally, all
these studies provide evidence of a positive correlation between the care variable and the residual
of the labour outcome equation. This positive correlation, interpreted in terms of simultaneity
bias, tends to suggest a positive reversal causality, that is a positive e⁄ect of the labour supply on
the propensity to provide care. As noted for instance by Ettner (1995) or Heitmueller (2007), this
empirical result appears inconsistent with the standard conceptual framework which suggests the
existence of a negative reversal causality and thus a decline, in absolute terms, of the impact of
the care variable when endogeneity is controlled.
*Causality direction : from labour supply to care provision
To the best of our knowledge, very few studies aim to identify how an exogenous shock on the
labour supply impacts the provision of care.
Using personal interview data on 460 persons with noncoresidential parent, Spitze and Logan
(1991) examine the impact of work hours on several parent care outcomes (frequency of interactions,
patterns of help and attitude toward the relashionship. They use OLS estimation and do not ￿nd
signi￿cant e⁄ect of employment on caregiving or interactions with the parent.
B￿rsch-Supan et al. (1992), who use data from Massachusetts (1986 HRCA Elderly Survey and
1986 HRC-NBER Child Survey), estimate a Tobit model and identify a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect
of employment (treated as exogenous) on time spent with parents5.
Stern (1995) adopts an IV approach with panel data using two waves (1982 and 1984) of the
NLTC Survey. The author estimates in the second year how the children￿ s probability to be the
primary caregiver is a⁄ected by their work status. By restricting the sample to parents receiving
no care in the ￿rst year he uses as instrument of the labour force status of each child for the second
year the labour force status of the ￿rst year. After controlling for endogeneity, results suggest that
work status does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the care provision.
5This positive e⁄ect appears consistent with the positive correlation between the care provision (as regressor)
and the residual of the labour supply outcome.
9Carmichael and Charles (2010) use a similar approach from 15 waves (1991-2005) of the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). They ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect of working less than 20 hours per
week and a negative e⁄ect of working more than 20 hours a week (in t) on the probability to
become caregiver (in t+1). Moreover, among those employed, they do not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect
of working time (in t) on the probability to become caregiver (in t+1).
To summarize, this pathway of causation appears less clear than the opposite one. Only Car-
michael and Charles (2010) ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of labour supply on the care provision (and only
for those who work more than 20 hours per week). Others studies ￿nd a no signi￿cant or a positive
e⁄ect.
* When both causality directions are simultaneously investigated
Finally, Boaz and Muller (1992), Pavalko and Artis (1997), Spiess and Schneider (2002) and
Berecki-Gisolf (2008) jointly estimate the two opposite pathway of causation. Overall, these studies
con￿rm the main message of the literature : an exogenous increase of the care provision a⁄ects
negatively and generally signi￿cantly the labour supply whereas an exogenous variation of the
labour supply have an unclear but generally not signi￿cant e⁄ect on the care provision.
Boaz and Muller (1992) use a sample from the National Informal Caregivers Survey (NICS)
which only include active caregivers. They use a two-step estimation. They ￿rst regress the weekly
hours of unpaid help and the work status, measured with an ordinal variable with three modalities
(no work, part-time work, full-time work) on all the exogenous variables of the model in order to
obtain predicted values uncorrelated with the model￿ s error terms. These predicted values are used
to replace the endogenous RHS variables in the second stage equations, which are the structural
equations of the model. Results suggest that conditionally on being caregiver, time devoted to
care signi￿cantly reduces the probability to work full-time but not the probability to work part-
time. Symmetrically, working full-time signi￿cantly reduces the care provision whereas working
part-time does not a⁄ect time devoted to care.
Pavalko and Artis (1997), who use panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature
Women, ￿nd that women aged 50 to 64 who start providing care signi￿cantly reduce hours of paid
employment. On the contrary, the work status does not signi￿cantly impact the propensity to start
providing care.
10Berecki-Gisolf et al. (2008) and Spiess and Schneider (2002) obtain similar results from the
Australian Longitudinal Study on Women￿ s Health (ALSWH) and the European Community Hou-
sehold Panel (SCHP). Spiess and Scheinder (2002) ￿nd however that being employed reduced the
probability to provide care more than 14 hours per week.
3 Data
For our analysis, we use the second wave (2006-2007) of the Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE follows the design of the US Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). It is a multidisciplinary
database of micro data on health, socio-economic status and social and family networks of more
than 30 000 individuals aged 50 or over.
For the purpose of this study, we restricted the sample to people aged 50 to 65, not only
because, over 65, the probability to work is close to zero, but also because the proportion of those
having at least one living parent is very low (￿gure 3).
We focus the analysis on care provided for elderly parent. Alternatively, we could have focused
on care provided by individuals to their dependent spouse but adverse e⁄ects on labour behaviour
are less expected given that it generally concerns elder caregivers who are already retired. As
previously mentioned, we also restricted the sample to respondents having a single living parent.
Moreover, because of a lack of information on intra-household caregiving we had to exclude children
living with their elderly parent. The ￿nal sample includes 4234 observations.
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In order to study the interaction between care and paid work, we use two variables : the number
of hours worked per week (W) and the number of hours per week devoted to parental care (IC).
Time devoted to care combines three activities : personal care, practical household help and help
with paperwork. One can assume that the articulation between care and labour supply di⁄ers
according to the kind of care. For instance, it can be easier to articulate help with paperwork
and work because this kind of care can be provided remotely. On the contrary, personal care can
require an personal investment of time and emotional more binding. However, the data does not
allow to distinguish time devoted to each kind of care. We then consider global caregiving time
without distinguish the kind of care. Note also that our de￿nition of caregiving does not take into
account moral support provided by the the child to his/her elderly parent. Concerning working
time, we adopt a broad de￿nition. We use here the information on the number of hours a week the
child usually work, regardless of his/her basic contracted hours. Alternatively, it could be possible
to use the information on contracted hours but in this case, we should exclude from the analysis
self-employed for whom the information on contracted hours is not available. Our choice may
potentially a⁄ects the results because extra-contracted working hours are probably more related
to caregiving behaviour than contracted hours.
Conditionally on our de￿nitions of caregiving and working time, 49% of the individuals in the
12sample are employed and 29% provide care for their elderly parent (table 1).
Table 1. Worker and caregiver distributions
Caregiver
0 1
Worker 0 1573 (37.1%) 579 (13.7%) 2152 (50.8%)
1 1422 (33.6%) 660 (15.6%) 2082 (49.2%)
2995 (70.7%) 1239 (29.3%) 4234 (100%)
The optimal time allocation is assumed to depend on three groups of variables. The ￿rst
corresponds to the individual socio-demographic characteristics : age, education level, marital
status, number of children, health status and the non labour income. We do not use the wages
as explanatory variable even if the information is available for workers. As emphasized by Ettner
(1995), the imputation of wage rates for non workers involves identi￿cation issues because the
variables that in￿ uence the potential wage rate are likely to directly impact the choice of work
hours. Following Ettner (1995) and Dimova & Wol⁄ (2010), we therefore include determinants of
wage rate in the working time equation, such as age or education level, rather than the wage itself.
The second group of variables corresponds to the parent￿ s characteristics. In our estimations,
we control for the parent￿ s gender, age and health status but also for the geographical proximity
between the child and the parent. To measure the parental health status we only have a variable
indicating how the child evaluate the general health status of his/her parent. In particular, no
information is available on the parent￿ s incapacity level, even though it may be partially captured
by the parent￿ s age variable. Moreover, we do not know if the parent lives in the community or in a
nursing home and if he or she receives formal care. This lack of information may lead to a negative
coe¢ cient correlation between the residuals of the two equations if, for instance, professional care
(in institution or in the community) encourages the child to increase his/her working time (to
￿nance the professional care) and reduces the caregiving time.
Finally, the third group of explanatory variables corresponds to the siblings￿characteristics.
Our estimations include as explanatory variables the number of brothers, the number or daughters
and the birth rank of the respondent. We distinguish the number of siblings according to their
gender in order to take into account that daughters are more likely to provide care than sons.
13Table 2 reports the distribution of each variables used among sub-samples (according to the
working and caregiving behavior) and for the overall sample.










n 660 1422 579 1573 4234
Working time per week (in hr, average) 36.9 38.5 . . 18.7
Caregiving time per week (in hr, average) 3.8 . 8.8 . 1.8
Country dummies
Austria 2.4 2.4 3.5 4.6 3.4
Germany 8.6 7.7 8.8 6.7 7.6
Sweden 10.2 12.2 9.0 5.2 10.3
Netherlands 12.1 9.4 10.5 6.7 9.0
Spain 1.1 5.3 2.6 6.0 4.5
Italy 3.9 6.1 11.7 11.0 8.3
France 8.9 11.2 11.1 11.4 10.9
Denmark 15.5 9.4 7.6 5.1 8.5
Greece 4.1 11.9 6.7 11.1 9.7
Switzerland 2.1 2.3 1.2 1.5 1.8
Belgium 11.8 9.1 13.6 10.7 10.8
Czech Republic 6.2 8.7 9.5 7.7 8.1
Poland 3.0 4.4 4.2 12.4 7.1
Individual characterisitics
Gender
Man 47.6 57.6 29.0 40.4 45.7
Woman 52.4 42.4 71.0 59.6 54.3
Age (average) 53.7 53.7 57.2 56.9 55.3
Education level
Pre-primary or primary educ. 7.3 11.1 18.3 27.1 17.4
Lower secondary educ. 14.4 16.0 23.0 19.8 18.1
Upper secondary educ. 35.8 36.4 33.2 37.1 36.1
Post secondary educ. 42.6 36.4 25.6 16.1 28.3
Healt status
"Poor" <1 2 6 11 6
"Fair" 13 12 21 25 18
"Good" 39 43 43 39 41
"Very good" 31 27 20 17 23
"Excellent" 17 15 11 8 12
Marital status
Not married 23.9 21.9 21.9 19.4 21.3
Married 76.1 78.1 78.1 80.6 78.7
Number of children
0 8.8 6.7 7.2 6.4 7.0
1 14.2 16.6 18.5 15.8 16.2
2 77.0 76.7 74.3 77.8 76.8
Monthly non labour income (average) 665.4 318.9 639.8 589.7 517.4
Siblings characteristics
Number of brothers
0 33.8 32.2 39.4 28.7 32.1
1 38.0 36.2 37.6 37.4 37.1













0 40.1 33.4 38.3 29.7 34.7
1 34.6 35.2 34.7 34.7 34.9
2 or more 25.3 31.4 26.9 35.6 31.4
Eldest child
No 61.1 62.7 60.4 57.8 60.3
Yes 38.9 37.3 39.6 42.2 39.7
Parent characteristics
Gender
Woman 88.0 84.3 88.6 86.6 86.3
Man 12.0 15.7 11.4 13.4 13.7
Age (average) 84.2 83.1 86.4 85.3 84.6
Health status
"Poor" 22.1 16.0 28.0 24.5 21.7
"Fair" 36.1 32.7 39.0 35.4 35.1
"Good" 30.3 34.9 22.1 27.1 29.5
"Very good" 6.8 11.3 6.9 8.8 9.1
"Excellent" 4.7 5.2 4.0 4.3 4.6
Geographical proximity
Same building 4.2 3.4 6.9 4.4 4.4
Less than 1km away 19.1 11.0 22.7 19.9 14.9
Between 1 and 5 km away 25.3 18.4 25.0 19.6 20.9
Between 5 and 25 km away 23.5 23.7 24.4 23.8 28.8
Between 25 and 100 km away 15.6 17.7 11.7 15.8 15.9
Between 100 and 500 km away 10.0 15.2 7.3 13.2 12.5
More than 500 km away 1.4 3.9 1.2 4.3 3.3
More than 500 km away in another country 0.9 6.7 0.9 5.0 4.4
154 Standard Microeconomic model
In order to study the individual time allocation between care and paid work, the literature
usually refers to a microeconomic model formalised by Johnson and La Sasso (2000). In this
model, a child (say a daughter) decides to allocate her time between paid work W, informal care
IC and leisure L. We assume the daughter is characterized by the following utility function :
U = u(C;L;IC) + ￿:v(IC;IC0;H) (3.1)
The utility function depends on the private consumption of a composite commodity C, leisure
time L and caregiving time IC. The daugther is assumed to be altruistic : her well-being depends
on her parent￿ s (say a mother) well-being v. We assume that the mother￿ s utility function depends
on care provided by her daughter IC, on care provided by others sources IC0 and on parental
health status H. Care provided by others sources and parent health status are supposed to be
exogenous6. Following Byrne et al. (2009), we consider that time devoted to parental care IC
a⁄ects the daughter￿ s well-being both directly (burden e⁄ect) and indirectly through its e⁄et on
the parent￿ s well-being.
The amount of care provided by the daughter IC is chosen by the altruistic daughter, the
mother adopting a passive behaviour. The daughter maximizes her utility function subject to the
two following constraints :
C ￿ wW + R (3.2)
W + IC + L ￿ 1 (3.3)
where w is the daughter￿ s wage rate and R the daughter￿ s exogenous non labour income. For
convenience, the price of the composite commodity has been normalized to one. Constraint (3.2)
states that consumption can not exceed the ￿nancial resources of the daughter. The constraint (3.3)
ensures that time allocated to work, parental care and leisure can not exceed the total amount of
time, normalized to one.
6We want to focus here the analysis on the interactions between working time and caregiving time. We then
assume IC0 and H as exogenous to simplify the analysis. A more realistic model should at least take into account
the e⁄ect of time devoted to care on the others members of family￿ s caregiving decisions, the use of formal care and
potentially the health status of the parent.
16We assume that the well-being of the daughter and mother are increasing in each argument
(uC > 0, = uL > 0, UV = ￿ > 0, vIC > 0, vIC0 > 0 and vH > 0), expect for the caregiving time
which directly a⁄ects U negatively (uIC < 0). We also assume that u and v are continuous, twice
di⁄erentiable and quasi-concave which implies that uCC < 0, uLL < 0, uICIC < 0, vICIC < 0,
vIC0IC0 < 0 and vHH < 0. Following Johnson and La Sasso (2000) and Byrne et al. (2009), we
￿nally assume that uCL = 0, uCIC = 0 and uLIC = 07.
Hence, for those caracterized by an interior solution, the ￿rst-order conditions which give the




uIC + ￿:vIC = uL (3.5)
The equilibrium condition (3.4) is identical to the standard labour supply model in which
workers allocate their time only between work and leisure. Under this condition, workers increase
their working time as long as the value of an additional hour of work (w:uC) is higher than the
marginal utility of leisure (uL). By adopting a partial equilibrium perspective, we can specify from
this condition a function which associate for each possible exogenous caregiving time the optimal
working time. Trough this function, the impact of an exogenous positive variation of IC on W opt







Given the assumptions made, this expression is strictly negative : the optimal working time
depends negatively on caregiving time.
According to the equilibrium condition (3.5), a daughter allocate her time so that her marginal
utility of caregiving is equal to her marginal utility of leisure. As previously, we can specify from
this condition a function which associate for each possible exogenous paid working time the optimal
time devoted to parental care. Trough this function, the impact of an exogenous positive variation
7In fact, uCL ￿ 0, uCIC ￿ 0 and uLIC ￿ 0 are su¢ cient conditions to obtain a negative relationship between
working time and caregiving time.





uLL + uICIC + ￿:vICIC
< 0 (3.7)
The sign of this expression is also strictly negative : the optimal caregiving time depends
negatively on working time. Then, the model predicts a strictly negative relationship between the
two activities : all exogenous shocks that increases time devoted to one activity leads to a reduction
in time devoted to the other.
To investigate the e⁄ects of some di⁄erent exogenous variables on the optimal time allocation,
the ￿rst-order conditions and the blinding constraints are completely di⁄erentiated. Some compara-
tive statistics from the model are presented in equations (3.8) below (for individuals characterized






































2:uCC + uLL) < 0 (3.8f)
where D = ￿uLL:(uICIC + ￿:vICIC) ￿ w
2:uCC(uICIC + ￿:vICIC + uLL) < 0
and vICIC0
8, vICH are assumed to be negative
According to the equations (3.8a)-(3.8b), a positive shock on the non labour income decreases
hours of paid work because the consumption increase reduces the marginal utility of consumption,
which in turn reduces the value of an additional hour of work. By reducing time spent working,
a positive shock on the non labour income increases indirectly time devoted to parental care9.
9Note that in the microeconomic formalization we only model the positive indirect e⁄ect, through working time,
of the non labour income. Our estimation results show that there is in addition a positive direct e⁄ect of non labour
income on caregiving time.
18Equations (3.8c)-(3.8f) indicate that when alternative sources of caregiving are available to the
parent, such as care provided by others relatives or formal caregivers, or when parent is in better
health, individuals devote less time to care and more time to paid work.
5 Empirical refutation of the standard Microeconomic mo-
del
Previous empirical literature validates only partially this microeconomic framework. Indeed,
the empricial literature mainly focuses on one causality direction, the one going from caregiving
behaviour to working behaviour. In most studies, this causality actually appears negative and si-
gni￿cant. On the contrary, the reversal causality, that is the one going from working behaviour to
caregiving behaviour is much less investigated and results obtained appears somewhat contradic-
tory with the implication of the microeconomic model : a large majority of studies provides results
suggesting that the labour supply does not a⁄ect the care provision. Note also that all studies
which estimate the e⁄ect of the care provision on the labour supply using an IV approach ￿nd
a positive correlation between the care variable and the residual of the labour outcome equation.
This could suggest, in opposition with the theoretical framework, that factor which positively af-
fect the labour supply induce an increase in the provision of care. In this section, we propose an
empirical strategy allowing to simultaneously estimate both reciprocal causalities.
5.1 Empirical strategy
From the two ￿rst order conditions of the previous microeconomic model, we speci￿y a reduced
simultaneous equations model taking into account that working and caregiving time are mutually
dependent and left-censored at 0. Indeed, some individuals may prefer not to work if they are
characterised by a reservation wage which exceeds the real wage and some others may prefer not
to provide care if the ￿rst hour devoted to parental care does not o⁄set the utility lost of reducing































i = xICi:￿IC + ￿IC:W
opt
i + uICi
where xWi (resp. xICi) and uWi (resp. uICi) capture the observable and unobservable exogenous
explanatory variables of time devoted to paid work (resp. parental care).
Considered independently, each equation refers to a partial equilibrium. The ￿rst equation
(W ￿
i = xWi:￿W +￿W:IC
opt
i +uWi) results from the ￿rst-order condition (3.4) which determines the
optimal working time conditionally on caregiving time (red curve in ￿gure 4). The second equation
(IC￿
i = xICi:￿IC + ￿IC:W
opt
i + uICi) results from the ￿rst-order condition (3.5) which determines
the optimal caregiving time conditionally on working time (blue curve in ￿gure 4). With regard to
the previous microeconomic framework, we expect ￿W and ￿IC to be both negative.





in the meaning that they de￿ne a situation in which the individual has no incentive to deviate.
In such a situation, the working time is optimal given caregiving time, while caregiving time is
optimal given working time.
Model A is similar to the model proposed by Amemiya (1974) because we assume that each
dependent variable is a function of the other observed dependent variable. It thus di⁄ers from the
model proposed by Nelson and Olson (1978) where each dependent variable is a function of the
other latent dependent variable11. The choice of one or the other speci￿cation is not neutral. It
depends on whether the theoretical economic model itself is simultaneous in the latent or observed
dependent variables (Blundell and Smith, 1994). In the model proposed by Amemiya (1974), the
10A utility fonction leading to the reduced speci￿cation 3.9 is for exemple : Ui(Ci;Li;ICi) = (Ci + ZCi)￿:(Li +
ZLi)￿:(ICi + ZICi)￿ where ￿, ￿ and ￿ are constant parameters and ZCi, ZLi and ZICi are linear functions of
individual and family characteristics : ZCi = ￿C +
P
￿Ck:xCki + ￿Ci, ZLi = ￿L +
P
￿Lk:xLki + ￿Li and ZICi =
￿IC +
P
￿ICk:xICki +￿ICi. The coe¢ cients ￿C, ￿L, ￿IC, ￿Ck, ￿Lk and ￿ICk represent constant parameters while
xCki, xLki, xICki, ￿Ci, ￿Li and ￿ICi represent observed and unobserved (by the econometrician) individual and
family characteristics.
11In the subsection 5.3, we presente estimation results from the Nelson and Olson speci￿cation. The main conclu-
sions are similar.
20censoring mechanism acts as a constraint on agent￿ s behaviour, whereas in the model proposed by
Nelson and Olson (1978) the censoring mechanism acts as a constraint on the information available
to the econometrician but not on the agent￿ s behaviour itself. By choosing the model A, we assume,
according to the previous theoretical model, that censoring mechanism a⁄ects the agent￿ s decision
making process. In others words, we consider for example that two non-workers, one characterized
by a reservation wage slightly higher than the real wage and the other characterized by a reservation
wage much higher than the real wage, will provide ceteris paribus the same amount of informal
care.
Figure 4. Illustration of the optimal time allocation when (1 ￿ ￿W:￿IC > 0)
Unlike the model proposed by Nelson and Olson (1978), model A may nevertheless present a
risk of incompleteness in the sense that, for a given vector of exogenous variables (both observed
and unobserved) it does not always predict a unique time allocation. This incompleteness stems
from the fact that model A de￿nes the optimal allocation as the intersection of two non linear
21functions, one giving the optimal working time as function of caregiving time and the other giving
the optimal caregiving time as function of working time.
As illustrated by ￿gures A1 and A2 in appendix A, this non linearity may potentially leads
to several intersection points. In this case, the model predicts multiple equilibria. To overcome
this di¢ culty, it is necessary to impose prior to estimating the model the following ￿coherence
condition￿(Maddala, 1983; Amemiya, 1974; Gourieroux et al., 1980) :
1 ￿ ￿W:￿IC > 0 (3.10)
This condition ensures the completeness of the model whatever the individual (observed and
unobserved) characteristics. In the subsection 5.3, we partially loosen this constraint by adding to
the model a selection rule which allows to select a speci￿c equilibrium in case of multiple equilibria
(Krauth, 2006). Results are similar because the model still converges to a situation without multiple
equilibria.
Note that the incompleteness characterizing this model is very di⁄erent from the incomplete-
ness charactering the model estimated by Fontaine et al. (2009) to study the interaction among
siblings in their caregiving decisions. The theoretical model was itself incomplet in the sens that
it de￿ned the outcome (the observed care arrangement) as as Nash Equilibrium of a game that
could potentially be characterized by no Nash equilibrium or by multiple equilibria. Here, things
are di⁄erent. The theoretical model is indeed "complet" because each individual is always cha-
racterized by one and only one optimal time allocation. However, the econometric traduction of
the theoretical model is incomplet because we de￿ne in model A the optimal time allocation from
the two ￿rst order conditions of the microeconomic model wich are necessary but not su¢ cient









denoted the probability for a given allocation to be optimal
12From this point of view, the estimation of a structural model would allow to compare the utility level associated
with each possible equilibrium and then "complete" the model by adding a selection rule choosing the time allocation
associated with the highest utility level. However, our reduced estimation does not allow to adopt this procedure.




































= P (uWi < ￿xWi:￿W;uICi < ￿xICi:￿IC)
We assume that the residuals are distributed according to a bivariate normal density function :
















































where ’ the joint density function of the bivariate normale.
The model can then be estimated with the maximum likelihood method. Here, we do not impose
the coherence condition 1￿￿W:￿IC > 0 during the estimation procedure but we verify a posteriori
that it is respected. Similarly, we do not impose the time constraint prior to the estimation but we
verify, for each individual, that the estimations do not lead to a cumulated time devoted to work
23and care exceeding 168 hours per week.
5.2 Results
Columns (1)-(2) of table 3 reports our estimation results when we include the same explanatory
variables in each equation. In this case, the identi￿cation of the parameters is only due to the
censure characterizing the working and caregiving time. The Appendix B reports estimation results
when we reinforce the identi￿cation by imposing exclusion restrictions. Speci￿cally, we exclude from
the working time equation siblings and parent￿ s characteristics and the number of children that is
variables that empirically appear correlated with caregiving time but unrelated to working time
(conditionally on the care provision). Symmetrically, we exclude from the caregiving time equation
the marital status of the child and some modalities of his/her education level and health status
that appear correlated with working time but unrelated to the caregiving time (conditionally on
the working time). Results are however very similar.
As expected, the working time is negatively associated with the age and the non labour income
but positively associated with the education level (column 1 of table 3). With regard to family
network, being in couple signi￿cantly reduces the labour supply whereas the number of children
is not signi￿cant. Moreover, the propensity to work is in￿ uenced by the individual health status.
Those declaring a ￿fair￿or a ￿poor￿health status present a lower propensity to work. Note that
this variable may su⁄er from an endogeneity bias since we do not control for the reversal causality,
i.e. the impact of working behaviour on health status. Results remains however unchanged when
we remove this variable from the estimation. Finally, none of the siblings and parent characteristics
are signi￿cant conditionally on time devoted to care.
Column (2) of table 3 reports the estimation results for the caregiving time equation. Woman,
as expected, have a higher propensity to provide care than men. Providing care is also positively
associated with the age and the non labour income and negatively associated with the education
level. Moreover, those declaring an "excellent" health status have a lower propensity to provide
care13. Being married has a no signi￿cant e⁄ect whereas the number of children reduces the pro-
pensity to provide care. The care provision is also a⁄ected by the siblings￿characteristics.
13As for the labour supply equation, this result may reveal the endogeneity of the healt status. Indeed, one can
assume that the care provision negatively impact the health status of the caregiver.






















Constant 31.97*** -19.90*** 32.85*** 1.05 26.34*** -11.38***
(4.05) (2.82) (3.85) (1.75) (3.05) (2.27)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characterisitics
Gender
Man Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Woman -17.98*** 11.86*** -17.38*** 4.21*** -18.34*** 8.37***
(1.11) (0.86) (1.05) (0.50) (1.01) (0.67)
Age
Age-50 -1.42*** 0.48* -1.19*** -0.56*** -1.11** 0.24
(0.49) (0.29) (0.46) (0.20) (0.44) (0.22)
(Age-50)2 -0.30*** 0.04** -0.30*** 0.03** -0.28*** 0.03*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Education level
Pre-primary or primary educ. -4.30** -0.21 -4.81** -0.71 -3.96*** -0.32
(2.02) (1.21) (1.88) (0.86) (1.83) (0.91)
Lower secondary educ. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary educ. 4.44*** -1.69* 4.37*** -0.19 4.19*** -1.03
(1.65) (1.01) (1.53) (0.72) (1.50) (0.77)
Post secondary educ. 13.13*** -2.02* 13.14*** 2.05*** 12.04*** -1.03
(1.71) (1.08) (1.58) (0.75) (1.56) (0.86)
Healt status
"Poor" -32.23*** -2.28 -29.41*** -5.31*** -28.32*** -2.62*
(3.18) (1.85) (2.93) (1.28) (2.85) (1.40)
"Fair" -9.57*** -0.27 -9.28*** -1.85*** -7.77*** -0.44
(1.63) (0.98) (1.52) (0.70) (1.47) (0.75)
"Good" Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
"Very good" 2.27 -0.70 2.11 0.29 2.16* -0.41
(1.40) (0.88) (1.30) (0.63) (1.27) (0.67)
"Excellent" 2.58 -2.46** 3.17* -0.61 2.91* -1.67**
(1.75) (1.12) (1.62) (0.80) (1.60) (0.84)
Marital status
Not married Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Married -3.82*** 1.18 -3.98*** -0.33 -3.41*** 0.68
(1.37) (0.85) (1.27) (0.61) (1.24) (0.65)
Number of children
0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 2.82 -2.01 2.87 -0.83 2.50 -1.35
(2.44) (1.49) (2.27) (1.07) (2.22) (1.13)
2 2.11 -2.77* 2.13 -1.50 2.25 -2.00**
(2.16) (1.33) (2.01) (0.95) (1.96) (1.00)
Log of the monthly non -1.68*** 0.77*** -1.65*** 0.17* -1.57*** 0.55***
labour income (0.21) (0.13) (0.19) (0.09) (0.19) (0.10)
Siblings characteristics
Number of sisters
0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 1.00 -1.40* 0.44 -0.99* 1.17 -1.11*
(1.32) (0.80) (1.22) (0.58) (1.20) (0.61)
2 or more 1.40 -3.12*** 0.73 -2.27*** 1.95 -2.34***

























0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 0.82 -1.13 0.13 -1.14** 0.96 -0.99
(1.31) (0.80) (1.22) (0.58) (1.19) (0.60)
2 or more -0.93 -1.85** -1.63 -2.14*** -0.62 -1.56**
(1.39) (0.87) (1.29) (0.63) (1.26) (0.66)
Eldest child
No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Yes 0.77 0.69 0.59 0.79 0.60 0.65
(1.21) (0.75) (1.13) (0.54) (1.10) (0.57)
Parent characteristics
Gender
Woman Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Man -1.31 -2.36** -1.44 -2.06*** -1.08 -1.82**
(1.58) (1.02) (1.46) (0.74) (1.44) (0.77)
Age
Age-75 0.16 0.47*** 0.12 0.39*** 0.00 0.36***
(0.13) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)
Health status
"Poor" Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
"Fair" -0.43 -3.00*** -0.16 -2.56*** 1.29 -2.55***
(1.54) (0.90) (1.46) (0.04) (1.40) (0.68)
"Good" 2.40 -6.85*** 1.58 -5.11*** 4.54*** -5.54***
(1.61) (0.98) (1.54) (1.54) (1.45) (0.73)
"Very good" 0.00 -9.08*** 0.04 -7.11*** 3.01 -7.29***
(2.21) (1.43) (2.10) (1.03) (2.00) (1.07)
"Excellent" -1.66 -6.67*** -1.19 -5.55*** 1.23 -5.37***
(2.81) (1.78) (2.62) (1.18) (2.54) (1.33)
Geographical proximity
Same building -0.25 1.99 0.53 1.78 -1.51 1.85
(3.07) (1.69) (2.85) (1.20) (2.77) (1.23)
Less than 1km away Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 1 and 5 km away -2.06 -4.76*** -1.55 -3.82*** 0.18 -3.88***
(1.87) (1.07) (1.76) (0.76) (1.69) (0.81)
Between 5 and 25 km away -0.75 -7.56*** -0.63 -6.01*** 1.77 -6.07***
(1.83) (1.08) (1.74) (0.77) (1.65) (0.81)
Between 25 and 100 km away -0.77 -11.02*** -0.23 -8.57*** 2.65 -8.52***
(2.02) (1.25) (1.92) (0.88) (1.81) (0.92)
Between 100 and 500 km away -0.52 -12.88*** -0.46 -10.27*** 2.85 -9.99***
(2.16) (1.40) (2.06) (0.99) (1.94) (1.03)
More than 500 km away -0.44 -18.54*** -0.83 -14.84*** 3.47 -14.17***
(3.46) (2.64) (3.27) (1.93) (3.13) (1.93)
More than 500 km away -1.76 -22.00*** -1.14 -17.14*** 1.81 -16.67***
in another coutry (3.01) (2.64) (2.83) (1.92) (2.74) (1.92)
Interactions between work and care
Hours of care (IC) -1.98*** -1.00*** .
(0.17) (0.20) .
Hous of work (W) 0.64*** . 0.42***
(0.04) . (0.04)
￿ -0.53***(0.04) 0.15***(0.05) -0.64***(0.04)
Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**,*** signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
26The number of brothers and number of sisters do not have the same impact on the caregiving
behaviour : both have a negative and signi￿cant impact on the propensity to provide care but,
as expected, the propensity to provide care is more a⁄ected by the number of sisters than the
number of brothers. The siblings￿characteristics may reveal the existence of contextual interac-
tions if the siblings￿characteristics (regardless their care provision) directly in￿ uence individual
caregiving behaviour, but may also reveal the presence of endogenous interactions, if the siblings￿
characteristics act as proxies of the siblings￿care provision (Manski, 2000). The model is however
unable to disentangle this two mechanisms. Furthermore, being the elder child has a posititif but
not signi￿cant e⁄ect on the propensity to provide care.
Regardless the parent￿ s characteristics, our estimation provides consistent results with the
existing literature. In particular, the child￿ s care provision depends positively on the parent￿ s
age and negatively on the parent￿ s health status. Our results also indicate that mothers receive
signi￿cantly more informal care than father14 and that children living further away from their
parents are characterized by a lower propensity to provide care than closer children15.
Turning now to the trade-o⁄between care and work, estimations results appear partially incon-
sistent with our a priori expectations. More precisely, our results suggest that the care provision has
a signi￿cant negative impact on the propensity to work (b ￿W = ￿1:98￿￿￿). This result is consistent
with the standard microeconomic model and the previous empirical litterature. However, the re-
verse causality suggests that time spent working has a signi￿cant positive impact on the propensity
to provide care (b ￿IC = 0:64￿￿￿).
To investigate the intensity of these relations, we estimated the two reciprocal marginal e⁄ects.
We ￿rst estimate the e⁄ect of a shock providing to each individual incentive to devote to parental
care one more hour a week. Table 4 reports the optimal time allocation variation and a decom-
position of this variation into an exogenous variation and an endogenous variation. The former
14In their structural model, Byrne et al. (2009) identify three mechanisms for the gender￿ s parent to in￿ uence the
care provision. Every things being equal, mothers and fathers may di⁄er according to (i) health status, (ii) the burden
associated with the care provision and ￿nally, (iii) the e⁄ectiveness of the care provision. Their results provide some
evidence that (i) fathers experience signi￿cantly greater health status than mothers (caregiving marginal utility is
thus higher for the child when he/she provides care for his/her mother rather his/her father), (ii) care provided for
mothers is less burdensome than care provide for fathers and (iii) care provided for mothers is less e⁄ective than
care provide for fathers.
15The fact that geographical proximity could be endogenous was examined by Stern (1995). The endogeneity bias
appears very limited.
27supposes that the caregiving behaviour is exogenous in the sense that it does not depend on hours
worked16. In the latter, the additional e⁄ect induced by the endogeneity of the caregiving beha-
viour is tacking into account. On average, the initial shock on time devoted to care produces a ￿nal
decrease of working time by 28 minutes, whereas the optimal caregiving time, after adjustment,
￿nally increases by 43 minutes. The working time reduction is thus relatively high. At least three
reasons may explain this e⁄ect. First, the analysis is focused on individuals aged 50 to 65 that is
a population for whom the caregiving behaviour may interact with the retirement decision. Some
individuals may then leave the labour market in order to provide care for their disabled parent,
in particular when others sources of care are not available. Following the decomposition proposed
by McDonald and Mo¢ t (1980), we show that 49% of this the working time decrease (that is 13
minutes) comes from the decrease of the probability to work17. Second, individual labour behaviour
also depends on the labour demand, which is not taken into account in our model. In particular, if
individuals may only choose between two work contracts (full time or part-time work), they may
be constrained to reduce their working time more than they would in order to provide care for
their parent. Finally, the depend variable considered here is the number of hours actually worked
per week, not the basic or contractual hours (only relevant for employees). One can suppose that
extra-contractual working hours are more a⁄ected by caregiving behaviour than contractual hours.
Similarly, Table 5 reports the optimal time allocation variation after a positive exogenous shock
on the working time. After adjustment, the caregiving time variation appears relatively small (+5
minutes). Although the magnitude of the e⁄ect is relatively small, the positif average e⁄ect of
working time on caregiving time calls into question the standard microeconomic framework used
to think the interactions between time spent working and time devoted to parental care. Without
going into speci￿cs at this stage (this is the purpose of the next section), one can argue that
this framework is quite restrictive because the interaction between working time and caregiving
time does not directly involved the agent￿ s preferences but only the time constraint. In others
words, through this model, if individuals were not constraint by time, the two activities would be
independent.
16Through this e⁄ect, we adopt a partial equilibrium perspective. One can see this e⁄ect as the working time
variation in a situation where the individual is virtually constraint to provide one more hour of care a week. Note
that in this situation the time allocation is not optimal for the individual.
17The remaining 51% corresponds to the e⁄ect on the time spent working conditionally on working. This decom-
position is however constraint here by the fact that our model does not separately estimate the e⁄ect of caregiving
on the probability to work and on the number of hours worked conditionally on working.







￿ICopt +1(a) (+1hr) -0.29(c) (-17 min) +0.71(e) (+43 min)
￿W opt -1.03(b) (-1 hr 4 min) +0.58(d) (+35 min) -0.45(f) (-27 min)
























￿W opt +1(a) (+1hr) -0.17(c) (-10 min) +0.83(e) (+50 min)
￿ICopt +0.19(b) (+11 min) -0.11(d) (-7 min) +0.08(f) (+5 min)

















To extend the comparison of our empirical results with those expected from the standard
microeconomic model, we simulate speci￿c shocks on the non labour income, on the parent￿ s
health status and on the number of siblings. Consistently with our expectations, ￿ndings indicate
￿rst that a 1000 Euros increase of the monthly non labour income leads on average to a decrease
in time spend working by 4 hours and 45 minutes a week and an increase in caregiving time by 25
minutes a week. Second, a deterioration of parent￿ s health status increases time devoted to care
by 35 minutes a week on average whereas working time decreases by 25 minutes a week. Finally,
having one more brother reduces caregiving time by 7 minutes a week and increases working time
by 5 minutes a week whereas having one more sister reduces caregiving time by 12 minutes a week
and increases working time by 8 minutes a week.
295.3 Robustness analysis
To check the robustness of our results, espcecially the positif e⁄ect of an exogenous variation
of working time on the propensity to provide care, we ￿rst partially relax the coherency condition.
Situations with multiple equilibria may arise when the two parameters ￿W and ￿IC are both
negative and when the product ￿W:￿IC is higher than 1. Three potential equilibrium may then
exist (one interior equilibrium and two corner equilibria, see ￿gure A.1 in appendix A ). In this
case, we add to the model A (3.9) a selection rule which allows to select a particular equilibrium
among the three potential equilibria (Krauth, 2006). Four di⁄erent exogenous selection rules have
been tested. The ￿rst assumes that each equilibrium has an equal probability (1/3) to be optimal
and then chosen by the daughter. The three others assume than one of the three equilibria is
always optimal and then always chosen by the child. See Bjorn and Vuong (1985), Fontaine et
al. (2009), Krauth (2006), Soetevent & Kooreman (2007) or Tamer (2003) for similar approaches
in a simultaneous discrete model. We still impose the coherency condition when the parameters
￿W and ￿IC are both positive because in this case, individuals choose to increase their working and
caregiving time until that time devoted to leisure be equal to zero, which seems unrealistic (￿gure
A.2 in appendix A). Results obtained are strictly unchanged in comparison with those report in
columns (1)-(2) of table 3 since the likelihood function still converges to the same value (each
individual been characterized by a single equilibrium).
We have also compared our results with those obtained by an IV approach. We ￿rst estimated









































The speci￿cation of the working time equation is unchanged compared to model A (3.9). Ho-
wever, contrary to previous model, the second equation is used to instrument the caregiving time.
This approach is similar to the one used by Crespo (2007) and Johnson & La Sasso (2000), which
only focus on the causal e⁄ect of the caregiving time on the working time, that is on the parameter
30￿0
W . Every variable which could directly or indirectly (through the working time) in￿ uence the
care provision are included as explanatory variables in the caregiving time equation (the vector
xICi then gathers the excluded instruments). The two equations are jointly estimated by maximum
likelihood method, allowing the residuals of the two equations to be correlated. Columns (3)-(4) of
table 3 provides the estimation results without excluded instruments, the identi￿cation being then
only due the censures. Column (3)-(4) of table B1 (appendix B) provides the estimations results
with excluded instruments. In both cases, the estimation results are very close from those obtained
with the model A. In particular, the estimated e⁄ect of an exogenous variation of caregiving time is
still signi￿cant (at the 1% level) and negative18. The marginal e⁄ect is however slightly higher (in
absolute value) : on average, one more hour of caregiving decreases by 32 minutes working time.













































Estimation results provided by columns (5)-(6) of table 3 without excluded instruments and
columns (5)-(6) of table B1 in appendix B with excluded instruments are also very close from those
obtained with the model A : on average one hour more of working time increases time devoted to
care by 7 minutes.
We have also distinguish the interactions according to child￿ s gender. The reciprocal e⁄ects are
in both cases slightly higher (in absolute value) for women but di⁄erences are not signi￿cant.
Finally, following the approach used by Boaz and Muller (1992), we have compared our results
with those obtained from a speci￿cation where we assume that the care provision and the labour
supply interact through the latente variables rather than observed variables. We then estimate the
18Note also that, similarly to the previous literature, we ￿nd a positive correlation between the residuals of the
two equations when we do not control for the direct e⁄ect of labour supply on the care provision.



























i = xWi:￿W + ￿W:IC￿
i + uWi
IC￿
i = xICi:￿IC + ￿IC:W ￿
i + uICi
As Boaz and Muller (1992), we use the two step estimation procedure proposed by Nelson et
Olson (1978). We ￿rst estimate a reduced form of the two equations and compute the predicted
values of both latente variables. These predicted values, which are uncorrelated with the model￿ s
error terms, are used to replace the endogenous RHS variables in the second stage equations. To
allow the identi￿cation of the parameters ￿W and ￿IC, we impose the same exclusion restrictions
than those used to estimate the model A. Table C1 (appendix C) provides estimation results.
Findings are consistent with those obtained from model A : a positive exogenous variation of the
propensity to provide care decreases the propensity to work whereas a positif exogenous variation
of the propensity to work increases the propensity to provide care.
6 Microeconomic model with partial complementarity
The aim of this section is to propose a reformulation of the microeconomic model in order to
account for the positif e⁄ect (on average) of an positif exogenous working time variation on the
optimal caregiving time.
6.1 How explain the positive e⁄ect of an exogenous variation of working
time on the optimal caregiving time?
The model proposed by Jonhson and La Sasso (2000) is only based on what the litterature called
the "substitution e⁄ect" (Carmichael and Charles, 1998). It comes from the time constraint : by
devoting increasing time to a given activity, the agent is constraint to reduce the time available for
other activities. Through this, working time and caregiving time appear as substitutes. However,
32due to the agent￿ s preferences, other e⁄ects may lead to a partial complementary between the two
activites.
The ￿rst one is the ￿protection e⁄ect￿ . Using results from a qualitative survey conducted in
France among women providing support to their elderly parent, Le Bihan and Martin (2006) sug-
gests that working is a protective activity for the caregivers. It allows them not to totally be
absorbed by their caregiver activity. Unemployed individuals could therefore have a lower propen-
sity to provide informal care for fear of not being able to limit their involvement, as the needs of
the elderly parent increase. Among the children, we can asssume that this e⁄ect is more relevant
for daughters than sons if the duty to provide care to an elderly parent lie more heavily upon
daughters than sons.
Two others e⁄ect can also occur : the "respite e⁄ect" and the "productivity e⁄ect".
The "respite e⁄ect" illustrates the fact that working may o⁄er to the caregiver a way of freeing
oneself from the emotional demands associated with the care provided for a relative (Carmichael
& Charles, 1998). This e⁄ect clearly appears in the declaration of a daughter who provides care to
her elderly mother : "And it￿ s true that being at work, it helps to decompress and we are confronted
with people who have had the same problem. So you can get advice. (...) Fortunately, there was the
job! Oh yes! If there had not been the work ... "19 (from Le Bihan and Martin, 2006).
According to the ￿productivity e⁄ect￿ , some occupations may allow the development of know-
how that can be used in caregiving (personal care for a nurse, help with paperwork for bank
employee). More generally, workers may be more inclined to accept a additional constaint on their
schedule than retired people who may be more reluctant to loose some freedom on the use of their
free time.
Through these three e⁄ects, working appears as a factor increasing the propensity to provide
informal care. Thus, they introduce into the analysis a kind of complementarity between the two
activities. Speci￿cally, theses e⁄ects appear related to the worker status and not directly to the
time spent working (conditionally on being a worker). To the best of our knowledge, they have
never been integrated within a microeconomic model.
19"Et puis c￿ est vrai que d￿ Œtre au boulot, ￿a aide quand mŒme ￿ dØcompresser et on se trouve confrontØe ￿ des
personnes qui ont eu le mŒme problŁme. Donc on peut avoir des conseils ￿ droite et ￿ gauche. (...) Heureusement
qu￿ il y avait le boulot! Ah oui! S￿ il n￿ y avait pas eu le travail...".
336.2 Simple microeconomic formalization




= u(C;L;IC) + ￿:v(IC;IC0;H) + s:IC:yW (3.14)
where yW is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual participate to the labour




= uIC + ￿:vIC + s:yW (3.15)
Through this speci￿cation, being employed increases the marginal utility of providing care by
a constant terms s, whatever the working time20.
This new framework allows to decompose the e⁄ect of labour supply on caregiving time into
two components : (i) a positif discret component and (ii) a negative continuous component. The
￿rst one illustrates that the worker status tends to increase the propensity to provide care through
the protection e⁄ect, the respite e⁄ect or the productivity e⁄ect, regardless the working time. The
second one corresponds to the standard substitution e⁄ect : each hour spent working tends to
decrease time devoted to parental care.
Among those initially not working (yW = 0) , the global e⁄ect of an exogenous varaition of
working time on the optimal caregiving time is a priori indeterminate. It depends on the magnitude





uLL + uIC + ￿:vIC
+
￿uLL
uLL + uIC + ￿:vIC
? 0
20Our purpose is here to explain the average positive e⁄ect of working time on caregiving time. We thus only
reformulate the microeconomic model to acount for this e⁄ect. It could however also be possible to add a symetric
discret component to the model allowing to disentangle the e⁄ect on the propensity to work of (i) being a caregiver
and (ii) the e⁄ect of time devoted to care conditionally on being a caregiver . We could thus adopt this speci￿cation :
U
00
= u(C;L;IC) + ￿:v(IC;IC0;H) + s:IC:yW + t:W:yIC
Here, working time directly a⁄ects the child￿ s utility but only if he/she is caregiver.





uLL + uIC + ￿:vIC
< 0
According to this model, our previous estimation results suggest that the e⁄ect of worker
status is relatively high and o⁄set (on average) the substitution e⁄ect. In order to validate this
interpretation, the next section aims to disentangle and identify the two distinct e⁄ects.
7 Empirical validation of the microeconomic model with
partial complementarity
To test the implications of the reformulated microeconomic model,we focus here the empirical
analysis on the e⁄ect of the labour supply on the care provision. We then adopt an IV approach
by expressing the working time equation in a reduced form21.
7.1 Empirical strategy
In order to disentangle the e⁄ect of being a worker and the e⁄ect of working time (conditionally
on being a worker), we estimate a selection model. In addition to yWi, we de￿ne a dummy variable
yICi which is equal to 1 if the individual i provides informal care, 0 otherwise. From these two








21We ￿rst estimate a recursive model allowing to simultaneously identify both reciprocal causal e⁄ects. The
exclusion restrictions involved, in addition to those implied by the selection model, and the size of the sample used
in the second step lead to quite unstable marginal e⁄ects according to the exclusion restrictions adopted. We then
decide not to present the results. Note however that the qualitative results appear very stable.





Wi = xWi:￿1W + xICi:￿1W + u1Wi








ICi = xICi:￿3IC + u3ICi
(3.17)
The e⁄ect of occupation on time devoted to parental care may then be decompose into :
(i) the e⁄ect of working time on time devoted to parental care conditionnally on being both




@E(ICi=yWi = 1;yICi = 1)
@Wi
(ii) the e⁄ect of the worker status independently of the e⁄ect of time spent working, ￿Wi.
In order to estimate this e⁄ect, we can simulate for each individual the di⁄erence between his
expected caregiving time conditionnally on being both worker and caregiver (2 S1), but assuming
a working time equal to 0 and his expected caregiving time conditionnally on being caregiver but
non-worker (2 S3) :
d ￿W i = b Ei(ICi=yWi = 1;yICi = 1;Wi = 0) ￿ b Ei(ICi=yWi = 0;yICi = 1)
According to our microeconomic framework, we expect b ￿0
IC to be negative and d ￿W i to be on
average positive.
To estimate these two e⁄ects, we need to take into account the potential individual self-selection
which may lead to expected values of the error terms di⁄erent from 0 in equations 3.18 and 3.19





E(Wi=yWi = 1;yICi = 1) = xWi:￿1W + xICi:￿1W + E(u1Wi=yWi = 1;yICi = 1)
E(ICi=yWi = 1;yICi = 1) = xICi:￿1IC + ￿0






E(Wi=yWi = 0;yICi = 1) = 0
E(ICi=yWi = 0;yICi = 1) = xICi:￿3IC + E(u3ICi=yWi = 0;yICi = 1)
(3.19)
36We then follow the Heckman procedure by modelling in a ￿rst step the selection process. However,
contrary to the standard approach, there is here two selectivity variables (Tunali, 1986). We then
estimate a bi-probit22, specifying the propensity to participate to the labour market, y￿
Wi and the
propensity to be caregiver, y￿




















Wi = xi:￿W + "Wi
y￿
ICi = xi:￿IC + "ICi
The correction terms wich appear in (3.18)-(3.19) may then be written as follow :




































where zWi = xW:￿W ; zICi = xIC:￿IC
ZWi =











’ is the univariate standard normal density function
￿ is the univaraite standard normal cumulative function
￿2 is the bivariate standard normal cumulative function
22Mohanty (2001), Wtzels & Zorlu (2003) or Louinord et al. (2010) use similar double selection models.
37The empirical strategy adopted to test both the existence of a positive e⁄ect of the worker
status and a negative e⁄ect of working time on time devoted to parental care may be summarized
as follow : (i) estimating the reduced bi-probit model; (ii) generating from the previous estimation
the selection terms; (iii) estimating jointly equations 3.18, and testing the signi￿cativity of ￿0
IC
(iv) estimating equation (3.19) and (iv) simulating d ￿W i:
7.2 Results
Columns (1) and (2) of table 6 reports estimation results of the selection equations. The inter-
pretation of the estimation results is here di⁄erent from the one of the previous model (table 3),
because we do not control for the care behaviour on the estimation of the probability to participate
to the labour market and for the work behaviour on the estimation of the probability to provide
care. The coe¢ cients associated with each exogenous variable capture then both the direct and
indirect e⁄ects. For exemple, table 3 shows that the child￿ s age has (i) a positive direct impact
(conditionally on working time) but (ii) a negative indirect impact on the propensity to provide
care (through the negative impact of age on the propensity to work and the positive e⁄ect of wor-
king time on caregiving time). Table 6 shows that if we consider the probability to provide care the
global e⁄ect of the child￿ s age is negative. The positive e⁄ect of the child￿ s education level on the
probability to provide care can be interpreted similarly. Except for the child￿ s age and education
level, the e⁄ects of all others characteristics on the probability to work or provide care have the
same sign that the direct e⁄ect highligh in the previous estimations (table 3). However, some va-
riables become no signi￿cant while others become signi￿cant when we consider the probability to
work or provide care instead of working time and caregiving time. In particular, the eldest children
are characterized by a higher probability to provide care.
The estimation of the second-step requires identifying instruments. First, even if the selection
terms are non-linear combinations of the covariates included in the selection equations, we follow
the literature by excluding in the second-step at least one signi￿cant variable in the selection equa-
tions. From this point of view, we need to identify at least one variable impacting the probability
to participate to the labour market and the probability or provide care but not the working time
and the caregiving time (conditionally on being both a worker and a caregiver). Second, contrary
38to the previous bi-tobit model where the non linearity of the interaction between working time and
caregiving time allowed the formal identi￿cation of the paramaters without exclusion restrictions,
the perfect linearity between working time and caregiving time at the second step of the selection
model requires to identify at least one variable a⁄ecting the working time but not directlly the
caregiving time. The choice of these identifying instruments is not obvious from a theoretical point
of view. We then decide to adopt an "empirical" strategy by excluding in the second-step equations
covariates which are no statistically signi￿cant (but signi￿cant either in the selection equations or
in the other second-step equation). Table D1 in appendix D reports some evidence allowing to
validate the exclusion restrictions. Each excluded variables added one by one in the second step
does not a⁄ect directly the outcomes and does not change the estimated e⁄ect of the instrumental
working time on caregiving time, under the hypothesis that the remaining instruments are valid.
Columns (3) and (4) of table 6 provides estimation resuts of the simultaneous estimation
of working time and caregiving time when we do not distinguish the e⁄ect of working time on
caregiving time according to the gender. Columns (5) and (6) of table 6 provide estimations results
when we introduce into the interaction a gender dummy variable. Restricting the analysis to those
being both a worker and a caregiver slightly changes the estimation results from those obtained
from the previous bi-tobit model. We recall that variables which are excluded from the second step
of estimation ("-" in the table) appears no signi￿cant when they are added one by one in the model
(see appendix D).We still ￿nd that men are characterized by a higher working time than women,
that being married reduce working time while the education level and the health status increases
working time. Age and non labour income, which a⁄ect the probability to participate to the labour
market, do not appear associated with hours worked. Note also that, as we do not control here for
the care provision, some parent￿ s characteristics appear signi￿cantly associated with working time.
Concerning caregiving time, with the exception of the health status and the geographical proximity,
the child characteristics do not signi￿cantly explain time devoted to parental care (conditionally
on being both a worker and a caregiver). However, as previously, caregiving time appears need-
driven (Spiess and Schneider, 2002)23. Indeed, the intensity of care is still related to the parent￿ s
characteristics and the e⁄ects appear (qualitatively) similar to those obtained from the bi-tobit
model. The only exception if the parent￿ s gender e⁄ect which is now no signi￿cant : children have
23"In short, the provision of care appears to be determined by the needs of the parents, while the ease with the
children can ful￿ll those needs play only a secondary role."(Johnson and Lo Sasso, 2000, pp.27).
39a higher probability to provide care to their mother but do not signi￿cantly provide more care to
their mother when they decide to provide care.
The main change from the bi-tobit model concerns the interactions between the two activities.
Conditionally on being a worker and a caregiver, a exogenous shock leading to work one hour more
reduces on average the optimal caregiving time by 8 min, the e⁄ect being however not signi￿cant
(P-value=0.52). When we distinguish the e⁄ect according to the gender, we ￿nd that the decrease
is however signi￿cant for women. Although no signi￿cant for man, both activities appears as
two competing activities when we restrict the analysis to those both participating to the labour
market and providing care. From this point of view, this results is consistent with the previous
microeconomic model.






















Constant 0.92*** 0.12 40.30*** 9.07** 40.35*** 6.83**
(0.17) (0.16) (4.49) (5.20) (4.18) (4.09)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characterisitics
Gender
Man Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Woman -0.64*** 0.31*** -6.95*** 1.76 -6.96*** 4.97**
(0.05) (0.04) (1.49) (1.61) (1.50) (2.41)
Age
Age-50 -0.09*** -0.04** ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(0.02) (0.02)
(Age-50)2 -0.01*** 0.00 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(<0.01) (<0.01)
Education level
Pre-primary or primary educ. -15.37* -0.07 -4.31* ￿ -4.35** ￿
(0.08) (0.08) (2.28) (2.10)
Lower secondary educ. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary educ. 0.19*** 0.02 -0.02 ￿ -0.06 ￿
(0.07) (0.07) (1.29) (1.27)
Post secondary educ. 0.59*** 0.27*** 1.86 ￿ 1.82 ￿
(0.07) (0.07) (1.43) (1.50)
Healt status
"Poor" -1.13*** -0.52*** 6.84 -5.17* 6.87 -5.40*
(0.12) (0.11) (5.59) (2.75) (5.57) (2.83)
"Fair" -0.38*** -0.12** 1.91 -1.69* 1.92 -1.72*
(0.07) (0.06) (1.44) (0.87) (1.46) (0.83)
"Good" Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
"Very good" 0.11* 0.05 -1.14 -0.79 -1.15 -0.79
(0.06) (0.06) (0.95) (0.62) (0.95) (0.61)
"Excellent" 0.10 -0.02 2.42** -1.11 2.43** -1.12
(0.07) (0.07) (1.10) (0.80) (1.15) (0.72)
Marital status
Not married Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Married -0.15*** 0.01 -1.34* ￿ -1.30 ￿
(0.06) (0.05) (0.79) (0.95)
Number of children
0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 0.13 -0.13 0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.14
(0.10) (0.09) (1.87) (0.96) (1.82) (0.88)
2 0.13 -0.14 -0.04 -0.79 -0.04 -0.86
(0.09) (0.09) (1.60) (0.71) (1.51) (0.70)
Log of the monthly non -0.07*** 0.02*** ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
labour income (0.01) (0.01)
Siblings characteristics
Number of sisters
0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 0.03 -0.06 0.66 0.48 0.66 0.45
(0.05) (0.05) (0.93) (0.49) (1.00) (0.50)
2 or more 0.06 -0.15*** -0.08 -0.88* -0.07 -0.83

























0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 0.01 -0.08 -1.29 -0.04 -1.29 -0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.93) (0.56) (0.91) (0.55)
2 or more -0.03 -0.19*** -0.33 -0.38 -0.32 -0.43
(0.13) (0.06) (1.25) (0.62) (1.24) (0.63)
Eldest child
No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Yes 0.01 0.10** 0.79 0.02 0.78 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.40) (0.53) (0.92) (0.51)
Parent characteristics
Gender
Woman Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Man -0.05 -0.23*** 2.20 ￿ 2.24 ￿
(0.07) (0.07) (1.45) (1.53)
Age
Age-75 0.00 0.03*** -0.05 0.25*** -0.06 0.25***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06)
Health status
"Poor" Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
"Fair" 0.01 -0.09 1.90* -2.65*** 1.90* -2.71***
(0.06) (0.06) (1.10) (0.81) (1.06) (0.77)
"Good" 0.16** -0.27*** -0.34 -3.43*** -0.33 -3.44***
(0.07) (0.06) (1.56) (0.80) (1.52) (0.81)
"Very good" 0.04 -0.45*** 3.23 -4.06*** 3.25 -4.13
(0.09) (0.09) (2.26) (1.34) (2.20) (1.28)
"Excellent" -0.06 -0.33*** 1.69 -4.00*** 1.70 -3.99***
(0.12) (0.11) (2.37) (1.13) (2.51) (1.21)
Geographical proximity
Same building -0.03 -0.02 2.31 3.02 2.31 2.95
(0.13) (0.11) (1.87) (1.90) (1.95) (1.89)
Less than 1km away Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 1 and 5 km away -0.01 -0.26*** 1.64 -2.16** 1.66 -2.20
(0.08) (0.07) (1.46) (0.85) (1.53) (0.81)
Between 5 and 25 km away 0.04 -0.49*** -0.31 -3.02*** -0.29 -3.02***
(0.08) (0.07) (2.03) (0.89) (2.15) (0.88)
Between 25 and 100 km away 0.10 -0.70*** 0.28 -4.50*** 0.31 -4.46***
(0.08) (0.08) (2.67) (1.08) (2.77) (1.12)
Between 100 and 500 km away 0.07 -0.88*** -1.18 -4.09*** -1.14 -4.06***
(0.09) (0.09) (3.55) (1.29) (3.58) (1.44)
More than 500 km away 0.11 -1.27*** 5.13 -5.67** 5.20 -5.53*
(0.15) (0.18) (6.71) (2.78) (6.55) (2.96)
More than 500 km away 0.03 -1.67*** 0.98 -4.36 1.07 -4.36
in another country (0.13) (0.17) (6.39) (2.73) (6.57) (3.07)
Interactions between work and care
Hous of work (W) -0.14 -0.08
(0.21) (0.21)

































Cov(u1I Ci;"Wi) -2.19 -2.17
(1.61) (1.57)
Cov(u1I Ci;"ICi) 3.63** 3.58*
(1.83) (2.00)
Standard errors are in parentheses. At the second step, we calculate standard errors by
bootstrap.*,**,*** signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
Turning now to the estimation of the discret e⁄et of being a worker on the time devoted to care
(table 7), results also appear consistent with the microeconomic model proposed : on average, the
participation to the labour market increases by 1 hours and 29 minutes per week time devoted to
care among women and by 34 minutes among men.
Table 7. Discret e⁄ect of the worker status
men
(1) mean of b Ei(ICi=yWi = 1;yICi = 1;Wi = 0) 6.48
(2) mean of b Ei(ICi=yWi = 0;yICi = 1) 5.91
(1)-(2) mean of d ￿W i 0.57
women
(1) mean of b Ei(ICi=yWi = 1;yICi = 1;Wi = 0) 9.96
(2) mean of b Ei(ICi=yWi = 0;yICi = 1) 8.48
(1)-(2) mean of d ￿W i 1.48
The global e⁄ect can ￿nally be summarized as follow : among the women caregivers who work
less than 9 hours and 25 minutes per week the labour supply has a positive e⁄ect on the time they
devote to provide care to their elderly parent, the positive discret e⁄ect of being worker is indeed
higher than the negative continous e⁄ect of time spent working; on the contrary, the labour supply
reduces working time for the women caregivers who work more than 9 hours and 25 minutes hours
per week because in this case the positive e⁄ect of being worker is totally o⁄set by the negative
43impact of working time. Among men, the e⁄ect of labour supply is positif for those working less
than 7 hours and 8 minutes per week and negatif for those working more.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines the trade-o⁄between paid work and parental care among individuals aged
50 to 65, that is individuals having a key role in informal care for disabled elderly but who are
also encourage to participate to the labour market. Our empirical analysis puts forward a time
allocation process that is not as simple as the allocation suggested by a standard microeconomic
framework. First, our ￿ndings suggest a negative impact of care on work, con￿rming the results
of previous studies. The main contribution of this study is however the analysis of the reversal
causality. From this point of view, our fundings suggest that conditionally on the labour market
participation, working time a⁄ects negatively caregiving time. However, the labour market parti-
cipation participating, regardless working time, has a positive impact on the propensity to provide
care. This positif e⁄ect is not so surprising if we refer to qualitative studies that highlight several
e⁄ects suggesting that being a worker may favour the care provision (protection e⁄ect, respite e⁄ect
or productivity e⁄ect). Our model does not allow to identify which of these e⁄ects come into play.
However, the protection e⁄ect appears more relevant to explain the gender di⁄erence we observe.
Especially, the positif e⁄ect of the worker status appears higher for women than men. Fnntaine
et al. (2009) suggest than economic considerations could counteract the duty to provide informal
care. If this interpretation is true, the protection e⁄ect of employment could be more relevant for
women, that is a population who can feel a higher responsability to provide care.
"But for my morale, it was better to work, it helped me. The work helps too! But it was
heavy!"(from Le Bihan and Martin ,2006). This declaration from a daughter providing care to her
elderly mother perfectly illustrates the duality of the e⁄ect of the labour market participation on
the care provision. On the one hand, working tends to reduce the burden associated with the care
provision but on the other hand, performing both activities could be "heavy" and require some
sacri￿ces. From this point of view, our ￿ndings suggest that the articulation between working time
and caregiving time also involves a important leisure time reduction. As suggested by Le Bihan
44and Martin (2006), juggling both the professional carrer and the care provision generally leads to
a contraction of family and social time.
Our study presents some limits. First, some potentially important variables are missing in
the data used, such as the use of formal care, the parent￿ s disability level or the parent￿ s place of
residence. In particular, some individuals in the data set may have a parent living in nursing home.
Moreover, we excluded from the analysis individuals co-residing with their elderly parent because
of a lack on information concerning their caregiving behaviour. Further research could consist
in estimating the labour and care behaviour simultaneously with the intergenerational household
formation. The paper is focused on hours worked. Further research should also consider the e⁄ect
of the care provision on other labour outcome such as the necessity to obtain more ￿ exible working
hours, the reduction in careers prospect or the necessity to take some time o⁄.
45Appendix A : Illustration of the incompleteness
Let us consider ￿rst a case where the model A predicts a single equilibrium. Suppose, for
example, a daughter for whom : xW￿W + uW = xIC￿IC + uIC = 20 and ￿W = ￿IC = ￿1=2




































The ￿rst equation (W ￿
i = 20 ￿ 1=2:ICi) is represented by the red curve in ￿gure 4 (pp.21). If
the daughter does not provide support to her parent, she decides to work 20 hours per week but if
she provides support to her parent, each caregiving hour reduce her working time by half an hour
per week. Beyond 40 hours of support per week, her reservation wage becomes higher than her
real wage, she then prefers not to work. Symmetrically, the second equation (IC￿
i = 20 ￿ 1=2:Wi)
is represented by the blue curve. Preferences of the daughter are such that she prefers to provide
20 hours of care per week if she does not work, whereas each hour worked encourage her to reduce
by half an hour per week her assistance. Beyond 40 hours worked per week, she no longer wishes
to provide care, her opportunity cost becoming too high. In such a situation, the equilibrium is
represented by the point (W opt;ICopt).
In example 1, the model is complete because it allows to predict a unique equilibrium. However,
the nonlinearity of the relationship between W and IC can lead to situations in which the model
is unable to predict the allocation chosen by the individual. To illustrate this kind of situation, let


























i = 40 ￿ 2:ICi
IC￿
i = 40 ￿ 2:Wi
46In this example, ￿W and ￿IC are both negative and does not respect the coherency condition.
Figure A1 illustrates this situation. Unlike example 1, where the model allows to de￿ne a single
equilibrium, the model predict here three potential equilibria. The model is then incomplete.
Figure A1. Exemple 2.
47Figure A2 also illustrate a case where the model does not predict a single equilibrium. Here
￿W and ￿IC are both positive and does not respect the coherency condition (example 3). The
time constraint leads here to multiple equilibria, each one being characterized by a leisure time
equals to zero. Note that without the time constraint, this situation would be characterized by no
equilibrium.
Figure A2. Example 3
48Appendix B : Estimation results of the Bi-Tobit model with exclusion
restrictions






















Constant 35.06*** -20.27*** 33.15*** 1.66 26.47*** -11.79***
(2.70) (2.59) (3.02) (1.75) (3.61) (2.07)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characterisitics
Gender
Man Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Woman -17.92*** 11.70*** -17.45*** 4.21*** -18.24*** 8.36***
(1.10) (0.85) (1.04) (0.50) (1.00) (0.65)
Age
Age-50 -1.31*** 0.44 -1.10** -0.56*** -1.13** 0.26
(0.48) (0.28) (0.45) (0.20) (0.44) (0.22)
(Age-50)2 -0.30*** 0.04** -0.30*** 0.03** -0.28*** 0.03*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Education level
Pre-primary or primary educ. -4.34** - -4.82*** -0.71 -4.20** -
(1.92) (1.88) (0.87) (1.67)
Lower secondary educ. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary educ. 4.45*** -1.67* 4.43*** -0.18 4.08*** -0.95
(1.61) (0.87) (1.52) (0.72) (1.45) (0.66)
Post secondary educ. 13.29*** -1.96** 13.35*** 2.07*** 11.86*** -0.91
(1.65) (0.95) (1.56) (0.76) (1.51) (0.77)
Healt status
"Poor" -33.27*** - -29.64*** -5.31*** -29.61*** -
(3.10) (2.91) (1.28) (2.75)
"Fair" -9.99*** - -9.46*** -1.86*** -8.12*** -
(1.53) (1.50) (0.71) (1.33)
"Good" Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
"Very good" 1.89 - 2.16* 0.30 1.78 -
(1.29) (1.29) (0.63) (1.11)
"Excellent" 2.17 -2.04** 3.04* -0.61 2.64* -1.39*
(1.72) (1.04) (1.60) (0.80) (1.58) (0.79)
Marital status
Not married Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Married -2.98** - -3.96*** -0.32 -2.77*** -
(1.25) (1.27) (0.61) (1.11)
Number of children
0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 - -1.20 - -0.84 2.35 -1.22
(1.37) (1.08) (2.21) (1.12)
2 - -1.98** - -1.50 2.02 -1.77*
(1.20) (0.95) (1.95) (0.98)
Log of the monthly non -1.68*** 0.74*** -1.66*** 0.17* -1.54*** 0.52***
labour income (0.21) (0.13) (0.19) (0.09) (0.19) (0.10)
Siblings characteristics
Number of sisters
0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 - -1.20 - -1.01* 1.20 -1.13*
(0.75) (0.57) (1.19) (0.61)
2 or more - -2.84*** - -2.30*** 1.98 -2.37***
(0.82) (0.63) (1.27) (0.66)























0 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1 - -0.98 - -1.15** 0.99 -1.01*
(0.75) (0.57) (1.19) (0.61)
2 or more - -2.08*** - -2.06*** -0.60 -1.56**
(0.81) (0.62) (1.26) (0.65)
Eldest child
No Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Yes - 0.86 - 0.76 0.58 0.67
(0.70) (0.53) (1.10) (0.56)
Parent characteristics
Gender
Woman Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Man - -2.63*** - -1.99*** -1.09 -1.80**
(0.96) (0.74) (1.43) (0.77)
Age
Age-75 - 0.51*** - 0.38*** 0.00 0.36***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)
Health status
"Poor" Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
"Fair" - -3.03*** - -2.55*** 1.19 -2.44***
(0.84) (0.64) (2.53) (0.68)
"Good" - -6.24*** - -5.19*** 4.46*** -5.43***
(0.91) (0.69) (1.45) (0.73)
"Very good" - -9.11*** - -7.12*** 2.96 -7.23***
(1.34) (1.02) (1.99) (1.06)
"Excellent" - -7.11*** - -5.49*** 1.19 -5.43***
(1.66) (1.27) (2.53) (1.33)
Geographical proximity
Same building - 1.91 - 1.74 -1.49 1.85
(1.58) (1.19) (2.76) (1.29)
Less than 1km away Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 1 and 5 km away - -5.23*** - -3.74*** 0.18 -3.89***
(1.00) (0.76) (1.68) (0.81)
Between 5 and 25 km away - -7.66*** - -5.99*** 1.73 -6.00***
(1.01) (0.76) (1.65) (0.81)
Between 25 and 100 km away - -11.15*** - -8.56*** 2.61 -8.49***
(1.17) (0.87) (1.81) (0.92)
Between 100 and 500 km away - -12.97*** - -10.25*** 2.84 -9.95***
(1.32) (0.99) (1.94) (1.03)
More than 500 km away - -18.55*** - -14.81*** 3.37 -14.05***
(2.54) (1.93) (3.13) (1.93)
More than 500 km away - -22.43*** - -17.09*** 1.85 -16.61***
in another coutry (2.56) (1.91) (2.73) (1.92)
Interactions between work and care
Hours of care (IC) -1.99*** -0.98***
(0.16) (0.18)
Hous of work (W) 0.64*** 0.43***
(0.04) (0.04)
￿ -0.52*** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04) -0.64*** (0.04)
Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**,*** signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
50Appendix C :Estimation results of the Nelson-Olson model




















Pre-primary or primary educ. -4.90*** -
(1.88)
Lower secondary educ. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary educ. 4.55*** -1.02
(1.52) (0.67)






















Log of the monthly non -1.65*** 0.48***










































Same building - 1.93
(1.20)
Less than 1km away Ref. Ref.
Between 1 and 5 km away - -3.86***
(0.76)
Between 5 and 25 km away - -6.34***
(0.77)
Between 25 and 100 km away - -8.98***
(0.88)
Between 100 and 500 km away - -10.71***
(1.00)
More than 500 km away - -15.31***
(1.93)
More than 500 km away - -17.63***
in another coutry (1?93)
Interactions between work and care
Hours of care latent (c IC) -0.19**
(0.09)
Hous of work latente(c W) 0.18***
(0.04)
￿ -0.04* (0.02)
Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**,*** signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
52Appendix D : Evidence of the non signi￿cativity of the excluded ins-
truments in the second step of the selection model
Table D1. Estimation results when the exclusion restrictions are relaxed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
*Working aquation
Age
Age-50 ￿ -0.53 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(0.30)
(Age-50)2 ￿ 0.00 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(0.95)





Age-50 ￿ ￿ ￿ -0.21 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(0.37)
(Age-50)2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.01 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(0.64)
Education level
Pre-primary or primary educ. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.44 ￿ ￿ ￿
(0.42)
Lower secondary educ. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Ref. ￿ ￿ ￿
Upper secondary educ. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -0.42 ￿ ￿ ￿
(0.58)
Post secondary educ. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -0.87 ￿ ￿ ￿
(0.43) ￿ ￿ ￿
Log of the monthly non ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.05 ￿ ￿
labour income (0.57)
Marital status
Not married ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Ref. ￿




Woman ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Ref.
Man ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.15
(0.37)
Hous of work (W) -0.14 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.15 -0.26
(0.52) (0.21) (0.52) (0.63) (0.70) (0.48) (0.53) (0.27)
P-values are in parentheses
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